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Abstract: In this paper, I outline the ways that reification as a pathology of what I call 
“cybernetic society” shapes the fundamental structures of the self and our shared social reality. 
Whereas the classical theory of reification was a diagnostic attempt to understand the failure of 
class consciousness, I believe we must push this thesis further to show how is fundamentally an 
ontological and not a merely cognitive or epistemic concern. By this I mean that it is a pathology 
of consciousness as well as social praxis and, as such, infects the ontological substrates of social 
reality.  In effect, reification is a collective rather than merely subjective phenomenon.  I explore 
this dialectic between our subjective and social dimensions of being to show how reification 
actively shapes self and world. I end with a discussion of how this theory of reification as an 
ontological concept can be used to overcome it via what I term “ontological coherence,” or the 
capacity of the self to reflect dialectically on the shapes of sociality that one inhabits, opening it 




1. The Reification Problem and Modern Philosophy 
Let me begin by stating my thesis in terms that are succinct as well as unequivocal.  Reification 
is the central problem in modern society.  It affects the basic formation of the self as well as the 
patterns of social power and forms of social reality that configure our world.  At another level, it 
is deeply constitutive of consciousness and the dimensions of our intra-psychic processes that 
shape our subjectivity.  This further implies that the systems of thought and the discourses that 
we use to comprehend and grasp our world is also affected by these prior processes of social and 
self-formation.  Reification is rooted in the specifically modern, technological and mechanical 
nature of the commodity form as well as the various forms of administrative and instrumental 
logics that have proliferated exponentially since the onset of the industrial age.  The deep roots 
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of this process have not been sufficiently appreciated by contemporary philosophy, the social 
sciences nor psychological and psychoanalytic theory.  What needs to be confronted is the ways 
that shifts in the political economy of late capitalism – specifically its integration of commodity 
production, mass consumption, cultural incorporation and technological, administrative 
management or what I term the “cybernetic society” – have been able to intensify the process of 
reification.  Indeed, I believe we are witnessing a phase of social life that is producing a 
phenomenon of hyper-reification where the traces of any form of critical autonomy and 
integrated individuality are being swept away.1  
 What I refer to here as the reification problem can, taken the brief sketch above, be 
understood to be a fundamental defect in our subjective and socio-relational processes that 
frustrate or even completely negate capacities for critical judgment and autonomous reasoning 
outside of the field of heteronomous value systems that shape and organize personal and 
collective life.  The reification problem does not denote reification as a general phenomenon, 
rather, it maintains that reification renders our philosophical attempts to construct critical, 
rational, or democratic theories defective insofar as these theories rely on a priori assumptions 
about human reason, communication, recognition, or reflective endorsement.  The reification 
problem disables these post-metaphysical philosophical paradigms forcing us to reconsider a 
critical-ontological approach to our ideas about critical consciousness and critical rationality.  
According to the post-metaphysical conception of human rationality, valid forms of reason 
emerge from dialogical, intersubjective processes that construct valid ethical norms according to 
democratic, shared procedures that guide our practices of reason-exchange.  The problem with 
these approaches is that they fail to accommodate the ways that the reification of consciousness 
 
1 I discuss this in more detail in my forthcoming book, Twilight of the Self: The Decline of the Individual in 
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perverts the cognitive and intersubjective capacities of social agents.  The result is a reproduction  
of forms of social power and social reality without critique thereby constricting the mutative 
possibilities of social rationality.2   
 Contemporary philosophical efforts to articulate a constructivist moral theory rooted in 
our intersubjective and reflective capacities therefore are fated to reproduce the pathologies of 
reified consciousness as well as the social relations, logics and processes that produce it.  What is 
needed is a more comprehensive theory of reification, not simply as an epistemological category 
but rather as an ontological category.  The thesis that I will defend in this paper will be that 
reification needs to be seen as affecting the social-relational as well as the subjective-
psychological dimensions of human reality.  Reification is an ontological category in the sense 
that it shapes and affects the self, the individual’s capacities for thought, reflection, perception, 
libidinal motivation, and so on; but it also shapes the practices and social-relations that are 
instantiated by them, thereby helping to shape the way the social world, social reality itself, is 
articulated.  Bringing these two dimensions of human ontology together – the inner, subjective 
dimension and the social-relational dimension – is the core aim of this paper.  It is my conviction 
that this is the most fruitful path to grasp reification as an active process that shapes our inner 
and outer worlds and which also can dialectically provide us with the means to overcome it and 
counter its dynamics.     
 
2. Reification as a Totalizing Process 
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To understand how reification has become so central, I want to first argue that it is a totalizing 
process in modern culture.  There has been a paradigm shift in political economy from an 
industrial society that spanned roughly from the middle to late-nineteenth century to the 
nineteen-seventies, through a neo-liberal rupture where the social-democratic welfare states were 
reorganized around the imperatives of capital, public goods were transferred to private control, 
finance ascended as the primary form of capital, forms of social solidarity eroded, and a new 
hierarchy rooted in hyper-concentration of capital into fewer hands took shape.  Accumulation 
was now the grounding logic for all other institutional logics.  What has taken its place is a more 
systemically integrated, technologically unified social system where the self has been subsumed 
by the systemic logics of late capitalism. 
 This might seem to call into question the relevance of reification in an age that is 
supposedly “post-industrial.”  Indeed, Lukács’ theory of reification was birthed from the 
theoretical insights of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, Hegel’s theory of estrangement 
(Entäusserung), Simmel’s theory of the “tragedy of culture,” and Weber’s ideas about “rational 
authority” and “instrumental reason” (Zweckrationalität) that he saw recoding modern culture.  
But as Anita Chari has insightfully pointed out:  
The dominance of immaterial labor in contemporary capitalism points to a 
change in the position of subjectivity within the capitalist mode of 
production.  As immaterial labor has become dominant within production, 
the production of subjectivity has taken on a direct role in the processes of 
capitalist accumulation.  More and more features of social life become 
productive for capital: styles, forms of communication (Twitter, Facebook, 
smartphones), communities, affects, and desires.3 
 
Indeed, the very notion that we live in a “post-industrial” society must itself be called into 
question.  If we understand the term industrial to denote factory labor or some kind of 
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exclusively material labor, then we can see that this has largely shifted to what Chari calls 
“immaterial labor.”  However, if we take the term to mean, as I think we should, the patterned, 
mechanical, mass production of commodities (services are in this sense a commodity), then we 
should see that it is not a post-industrial society that we inhabit, but a society where industry is 
the central organizing principle behind every form of life.4  The process of mass 
commodification is a logical consequence of the accumulation pressures that have driven down 
profit rates in post-WWII developed economies, largely due to the saturation of markets.  The 
increasing need to turn every aspect of life into a commodity has the consequence of a total 
process of reification: a kind of total subsumption of the self to the logic of the commodity form, 
the severing of subjectivity from its onto-formative capacities, and the dissolution of capacities 
for critical autonomy and agency.  
 The massification of the commodity form extends beyond the material domain and into 
the subjective states of individuals, as Chari notes.  But it is not only the commodity form that 
has this formative power over the self and society.  Also important to consider are the ways that 
this new political economy is organized according to a technical-administrative needs for 
regularity as time and labor become more controlled and managed.  Efficiency is  now the 
essential logic of a financial, service based economy.  The self now becomes subsumed by the 
logics of efficiency and the commodification of experience and all forms of human praxis.  The 
new regimes of work, education, culture and “private life” are all dominated by the commodity 
form, by the need for extracting surplus and, as a result, the self becomes folded into the 
dynamics of the system itself.  Reification now becomes hyper-reification where there are no 
 
4 As Ernest Mandel observes: “Late capitalism, far from representing a ‘post-industrial society,’ thus 
appears as the period I which all branches of the economy are fully industrialized for the first time; to which one 
could further add the increasing mechanization of the sphere of circulation . . . and the increasing mechanization of 
the superstructure.” Late Capitalism. (London: Verso, 1975), 191.  
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longer any viable, let alone robust, dimensions of life or experience external to the imperatives of 
the system itself.  Now, the self lacks any reservoirs of psychic or cultural energy that can be 
tapped against the system’s needs and norms.  The self now operates according to the 
institutional logics of capital.  This phenomenon I term the cybernetic society because it takes on 
the features of a self-regulating system steered according to the common logics of capital. To 
understand how this new phase of capitalism shapes the self and creates this new intensity of 
hyper-reification, we will need to explore the ways that is shapes our social world as well as the 
dynamics of subjectivity and the self.   
 
3. The Social Field of Reification: Praxis and Social Reality 
Now that I have shown how pervasive the process of reification actually is, I would like to break 
down the way that we can conceive of reification as an ontological category.  I will do this by 
first arguing that human reality is social reality; that to be social is to be an agent of praxis, and 
that social practices possess certain features that grant them ontological status.  Human beings 
are inherently, essentially social by which I mean that out ontogeny is functionally dependent on 
the relational shapes and dynamics present during the course of our biological and psychological 
growth.  A practice is therefore an inherently social form of activity in that it requires some other 
to coordinate it and to generate it.  Our phylogenetic capacities – say, for language, thought, 
intentionality, purposive activity, and so on – are really not conceivable asocially.  Our social 
relations with others are therefore deeply constitutive of our inner world and our ontogenetic 
capacities. 
 As I define it, a social practice is an activity that seeks to realize some end or purpose.  
Practices can be subjective, as when I think about what I will make for supper this evening, or 
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they can externalized, as when I talk with a friend, teach a class, or board a train with others.  
The core element in each of these is some intention that I seek to realize in the world.  Each 
social practice requires another person in some basic sense.  When I deliberate with myself about 
what I may make for supper this evening, this process, indeed, this capacity as a whole, requires 
that someone taught me how to use language, which itself organizes my consciousness into 
discrete thoughts, and which enables me to participate in the ritual of “cooking” and “eating” a 
thing called supper.  None of this is the product of some idiolect, but is rather made possible by 
the existence of others.  Practices are therefore generative in the sense that they create some non-
natural thing in the world.  A thought, an artifact, are examples of our re-working of nature and 
the generation of some new reality.  Making pasta for supper requires not only my subjective 
sense of what pasta is, how to cook it, and so on; it also requires that an external social reality 
exist – farmers who farm and process wheat, distribution and delivery networks so I can 
purchase it, and shops that are staffed with people who can make it available to me.  This 
complex social reality interacts with and, in many ways, renders possible my intention to make 
pasta for supper this evening.  But the key idea here is that a practice is generative of a new 
reality – without these various social processes and social relations, the reality of my supper will 
be impossible.  
We can therefore break a social practice down into several basic features: it is relational, 
intentional, and generative.  This means that our distinctly human world can be grasped as 
relationally and purposefully generated by us.  Only when we see our social world in this way 
can we begin the process of breaking down the pathology of reification and begin to possess 
rational, cognitive grip of the truth-content of social being itself.  As Karel Kosík rightly points 
out: “The onto-formative process of human praxis is the basis for the possibility of ontology, i.e., 
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for understanding being.  The process of forming a (socio-human) reality is a prerequisite for 
disclosing and comprehending reality in general.”5  In contrast to what A. E. M. Anscombe 
refers to as “brute facts,” a social fact or social reality is the product of our collective human 
practices.  The social world exists, has its own ontology, in this sense, only as a product of our 
collective practices and the relations, structures, processes and ends or purposes toward which 
they are organized.  This constitutes the basic essence of an ontology of the social: practices, 
relations, processes and purposes are the basic conceptual building blocks of our social world, of 
our social reality itself.  The reason for this is that it accounts dialectically for the ways that our 
distinctive status as social beings – i.e., as practical beings – can be linked to the ontological 
status of the social world.  Human beings possess world-generating powers through the capacity 
of social practices to serve as recombinative forces within the sphere of nature.  The generative 
capacity is enhanced by the different arrangements of our cooperative relations and can be 
organized toward different ends and purposes.   
Social power is, in this way, a central feature of our social ontology.  How power is 
distributed, how it is instantiated has a formative impact on the ways our relations are shaped as 
well as the purposes that are set for our social processes and institutions, and so on, all constitute 
a field of social power in that norms need to be put into place to shape our practices, relations 
and purposes.  The key problem with reification is that it renders our self-understanding 
defective; it prevents us from seeing our social world as ontological, as the product of our 
inherent formative powers as socio-practical beings and instead replaces this with routine 
thinking, with the utilitarian logic that allows us to maneuver through what appears to us as a 
static world.  This is the realm of the ontic, of a social world that is alienated from a self-
 
5 Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1976), 139.  
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consciousness that it is ours; it is the product of a kind of power that enables some to control and 
organize social reality according to their purposes and projects.  The ontic is the concealment of 
the ontological; it is the forgetting of ourselves as socio-practical, poietic beings.  Such a world 
seems to us as appearance, not as changeable, mutative.6  It has essentially become reified – both 
subject and object are split from one another and understood separately, thereby reifiying both 
self and world.  The shift from the ontological to the ontic is therefore a shift not only in how we 
understand ourselves and our relations with the world, it also describes the actual ways that 
social power is able to organize the objective social features of the world itself: of how we relate, 
how our practices are shape, the ends and purposes toward which our activities and institutions 
should be organized, and so on.    
Each of these five dimensions of social ontology – practices, relations, structures, 
processes and purposes – are dialectically interrelated in that none of them can be absent, each 
one mediating the other.  Add to this that these five categories, taken as a total process, open up 
for us the ways that reification can be viewed as an ontological as opposed to merely an 
epistemological category or some kind of cognitive defect or pathology of consciousness alone.  
The reason for this is that, as I have been arguing in line with Hegel, Marx and Lukács, the 
essential nature of human being is that, as Kosík observes: “we ourselves form reality, and know 
that reality is formed by us.  In this respect, the difference between natural reality and socio-
human reality is this, that though man can change and transform nature, he can change socio-
human reality in a revolutionary way; but he can do so only because he forms this reality 
 
6 Kosík describes what I am calling the ontic in this context well when he writes: “the phenomenal form of 
things is the natural product of everyday praxis.  The everyday utilitarian praxis gives rise to ‘routine thinking’ – 
which covers both familiarity with things and with their superficial appearance, and the technique of handling things 
in practice – as a form of movement and existence.  But the world that exposes itself to man in his fetishized praxis, 
in procuring and manipulation, is not a real world, though it does have a real world’s ‘firmness’ and its 
‘effectiveness’; rather, it is a ‘world of appearances.’” Dialectics of the Concrete, 5.  
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himself. . . . It is the comprehension of socio-human reality as the unity of production and 
products, of subject and object, of genesis and structure.”7  To say that the ontological becomes 
ontic as a result of reification is to say that the social world becomes concealed as a human 
product; that it is immune to change, that we are fated to live in accordance with the dominant 
ideological system of values, concepts and categories that shape the practices and reproduce the 
social reality of our world.  In this way, reification shapes our praxis in a fundamentally 
heteronomous way: it shrouds the projects of the powerful in the mists of second nature and 
cements social domination and the systems of extraction by rooting it in the shared collective 
concepts and norms that undergird our practices – practices that articulate the relations, 
structures, processes, and purposes of our social world.    
 
4. The Subjective Field of Reification: Normative Entanglement 
The subjective field of reification is the product of this reified social field.  It is dialectically 
related to it rather than simply caused by it as if it were an external thing shaping the internal 
reality of subjects.  Rather, the dialectical nature of the relation between the social and subjective 
aspects of reification is that there can be no reification of consciousness without it having an 
impact on our socio-relational world just as reification is itself produced within the self via the 
socio-relational forms of life and their dynamics exerting internalization pressures on the self.  
As such, reification at the level of the subject is produced by (i) the subject’s internalization of 
norms from external, social practices and institutions, what I call normative entanglement; and 
(ii) by the internalization of external objects (i.e., relations to other persons) in the process of 
psychic development.  These two circuits of internalization are dialectically related and cannot 
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exist without the other, indeed, both mediate and co-produce the other.  What is crucial to 
understand in this process is that the reification of consciousness not only affects our cognitive 
faculties, but the very construction of the self as a system of thinking, feeling, perceiving.  The 
effects of reification on self-development and the intra-psychic processes of the individual are 
important to understand since it is here that the very fulcrum to fight reification is to take place.  
Only when subjectivity has been absorbed by the false totality can it be rooted in a more 
trenchant, more permanent way within the structure of the self. 
 The original theory of reification as articulated by Lukács was not concerned nor 
informed by the theories or approach of psychoanalysis.  Instead, it emerged from the 
philosophical concern over the ontology of consciousness as well as debates over the 
phenomenological structure of perception of the object domain.8  What I would like to suggest 
here is that there is a psychoanalytic approach to reification that can be pursued and grant us 
insight into the depths of subjective pathologies that it can cause.  My strategy is to show that 
reification shapes the normative structures of consciousness on the one hand but also that it is 
able to transform our intersubjective relations with others and, consequently, the intra-psychic 
dynamics of the subject.  The importance of this approach is that it is able to highlight the ways 
that this hyper-reification shapes a new kind of subjectivity: one that is unable to articulate the 
psychic resources needed for radical transformation no less than critical judgment and 
solidarism.  What reification does at this level is de-autonomize the subject’s inner capacities for 
 
8 For more on the philosophical aspects of Lukács’ theory of reification, see the important discussions by 
Christian Lotz, “Categorial Forms as Intelligibility of Social Objects: Reification and Objectivity in Lukács,” in G. 
Zucker (ed.) Confronting Reification: Revitalizing Georg Lukács’ Thought in Late Capitalism. (Leiden: Brill, 2020): 
25-47; Andrew Feenberg, The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School. (London: Verso, 
2014); Richard Westerman, Lukács’ Phenomenology of Capitalism: Reification Revalued. (New York: Palgrave, 
2019); and Konstantinos Kavoulakos, Georg Lukács’s Philosophy of Praxis: From Neo-Kantianism to Marxism. 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2018).  
 12 
basic psychic creativity such as imagination and fantasy as well as re-circuit the libidinal and 
relational capacities of the self.   
 Let me begin with the theory of what I call normative entanglement.  One central feature 
of our lives as social beings is the existence of norms.  Norms are the means by which our 
practices are structured and shaped no less than the basis for our capacity to coordinate our 
activities with others.  It is a fundamental means by which we organize our inner thoughts as 
well as our socio-practical field of activity.  Without norms, there is no way to organize 
cooperative activities; without these cooperative activities, there can be no society.  In essence, 
norms are the basis for the background conditions for how we structure our social world and, by 
extension, our consciousness as well.  The real question is where do these norms gain their 
authority and how are they internalized by subjects? 
 Research into the ontogenetic development of human beings has focused on the ways that 
norms coordinate our activities, but it also focuses on the ways that social learning occurs and 
the ways that norms are internalized by individuals.  A norm can be seen as a way of organizing 
intentionality – the capacity to attribute meaning to things.  Collective intentionality is the basis 
for the ways that our cognition of social facts are organized and made possible.  Collective forms 
of intentionality are what make possible shared concepts and practices.  The bound pieces of 
paper in front of me is a book; it is a book not because it is so by nature, it is social not a brute 
fact since I have been taught along with everyone else that such an object is a book.  This is a 
simplistic example, but more complex forms of social reality can be constructed by assembling 
increasingly complex and interconnected collective-intentional rules that articulate institutional 
forms of reality.9  The key idea here is that these collective-intentional rule-sets are produced by 
 
9 The literature here is large and familiar by now. But see John Searle, Making the Social World: The 
Structure of Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) for a broad overview and discussion.  
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us; they are not natural facts or properties of nature, nor do they obey natural laws.  Hence, social 
norms that sustain institutions such as showing deference to members within a hierarchy, ways 
of relating to members of different genders, and so on are all conventions: they create and sustain 
certain forms of life; they are generative of a specific kind of social ontology.   
 The key place where reification enters this discussion is in the ways that these collective-
intentional rule sets enter into consciousness and effectively reify it, controlling and directing our 
onto-formative capacities according to the external, heteronomous logics of others.  This distorts 
the phylogenetic capacities that developing members of the community possess as a core feature 
of human sociality.  As Michael Tomasello makes clear: “Human children are born into a nexus 
of social norms exhorting them to behave in some ways and not in others.  From early in life, 
children conform to social norms as articulated and enforced by adults.”10  The key issue here is 
the capacity of an “I-perspective” to turn into a “we-perspective”; to create the conditions for the 
cooperative production of cultural artifacts and social institutions, in short, to become human as 
part of a human community.  Seen from this developmental point of view, collective 
intentionality is the “cognitive capacity to form a group-minded ‘we’ and so to participate in 
conventions, norms, and institutions, and to view things from ‘objective’ and normative 
perspectives.”11 
 If norms are so basic and fundamental to the capacity for sociality to develop, then what 
happens if the “nexus of social norms” comes to be shaped by external institutional logics? What 
happens when parents enforce norms of “success” of consumption and so on at an early age of 
child development?  What happens when, with the proliferation of screens and technological 
 
10 Michael Tomasello, Becoming Human: A Theory of Ontogeny. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2019), 254. Also see 45ff.   
11 Tomasello, Becoming Human, 305. 
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gadgets, become aimed at younger age groups, and their own sense of imagination and wonder 
become colonized by the commodification logics embedded within these devices?  What 
happens as the norms of capitalist, consumptive, possessive individualism crowd out norms of 
cooperation and common goods?  Think even of the ways that neoliberal regimes of management 
have taken over education, university life; the ways that mass culture continues to be shaped by 
the patterned forms of feeling that constrict human experience, and so on.  Normative 
entanglement is the phenomenon where the nexus of social norms is infiltrated by the 
institutional, administrative, productive and consumptive logics of cybernetic society; when the 
developing individual come into contact with the social density of this nexus of norms, then they 
become the normative basis for collective intentionality.  In this way, they become the very 
background conditions for articulating the social world.  As more and more of the non-economic 
spheres of life are themselves colonized by the logic of capital, of efficiency, of the commodity 
form, the less that the nexus of norms needs to compete with alternative values and collective-
intentional rules.  Religion, aesthetic perception and experience, scientific and philosophical 
pursuits, and so on, no longer serve as guiding vocations and pursuits because the background 
normative conditions no longer exist to give them any integrity outside of the sphere of capital.  
 This is reification in the sense that the shared nexus of norms is created by and is 
designed to serve only the economic logics of the social system.  The potential for conflict – 
class-based in social terms and neurotic in the form of the intra-psychic dynamics of the self – is 
lessened and the world that capital seeks to create is embedded in the nexus of social norms 
internalized by the individual through socialization processes.  The cognitive problem here is 
obvious: as norms of cooperation are altered by the changing relations of production under 
capitalism, the self begins to change.  The self is no longer in conflict with the demands of the 
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system, but comes to see the system as “natural,” as the “way the world works,” the “natural 
order of things,” and so on.  There should be no doubt that this is an expression of power, 
domination: it is a kind of domination I have called constitutive domination in that it expresses 
the power of some to be able shape the nexus of norms, the shared conventions and value-
orientations that organize the social world.12  Indeed, as the normative structure of consciousness 
is shaped by the nexus of norms rooted in capitalist imperatives, the entanglement of these norms 
within the cognitive capacities of the individual gradually eclipse the capacity for critique, for 
experimentation, for a desire for the new.  
  
5. Reification of the Self: A Psychoanalytic Approach 
Now, if reification is a social-ontological concept, as I have been suggesting, then the self’s own 
relation to others will be a primary way that we can glimpse the subjective dimensions of the 
pathology.  Normative entanglement demonstrates how external norms that are rooted in 
institutional logics shaped by capital become braided with the self’s own structures of 
consciousness.  But I would like to go a bit deeper than this, specifically to show that the self can 
become like an object, lacking any authentic creative, spontaneous or imaginative capacities 
outside of the parameters that have been internalized via the social system.  The key idea here is 
that self becomes an object to itself just as the external relations to others take on the same 
character.  One way that this can be glimpsed in modern culture is in the treatment of one’s own 
body as an object: the proliferation of tattoos, piercings, of commodified phrases bandied about 
in public on t-shirts, and so on – all render the self inert and seek to displace language with 
 
12 See my discussion of constitutive domination in The Domestication of Critical Theory. (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).  
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image, what is dynamic and generative with what is static, non-dialectical.  One’s own physical 
body is treated as an object, as a thing.   
 This extends to deeper levels of the self and its increasing shallowness of subjectivity.  
As self and world become increasingly infected by reification, the self’s capacities for creativity, 
for subjective experimentation, fantasy and meaning constrict; each comes to see oneself as an 
object, in increasingly concrete terms.  Little wonder why adolescents and adults view their own 
sense of self as bereft of meaning, experience anxiety at the prospects of failing in life, and fail to 
see meaning and value outside of the prescribed institutional goals and values of the prevailing 
system.  Creativity, autonomy, spontaneity is crushed by the process of socialization and 
internalization of the norms and values of the society.  The self becomes increasingly deflected – 
deflected away from one’s own capacities as a creative, imaginative and generative being toward 
the nexus of common norms, practices and values that embody the society at large.13  Each 
comes to see oneself and the society at large as objects.  This indicates that at a deeper level 
there also seems to be a psychological objectification of self that emerges as reification 
penetrates consciousness.  The constriction of meaning, the de-dialectization of consciousness, 
the repression of autonomous desire and generativity – all point to the effects of reification on 
the inner dynamics of the self.   
As I see it, a psychoanalytic approach to the problem of reification emphasizes the ways 
that the structure and dynamics of the self, of the intra-psychic processes of consciousness are 
affected by the socialization of the nexus of social norms rooted in administrative, technical 
capitalist institutions.  The penetration of the logics of efficiency, of commodification, of 
 
13 The term deflected self I take from Christopher Bollas who notes that the deflected self is “a self that is 
transferred elsewhere.” See his The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), 152 and passim.  
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instrumentality all have deep effects on the self’s organization of its inherently creative, 
generative, libidinal and cathectic dynamics.  Reification organizes these aspects of the inner 
world of the self in such a way because the socialization process is not simply one where we 
uptake dominant external social norms.  At a deeper level, these norms are introjected into the 
self by which is meant that the external norm or value or concept is taken and becomes part of 
the psychic structure of the individual.  This is a deeper, more entrenched form of reifying 
experience than merely being socialized by patterned activities and institutions.14  Since this 
occurs at a younger age than it did during the period of industrial capitalism, the cybernetic 
phase of capitalism is able to root its imperatives into the inner subjective world of the self.  
Indeed, where we can see psychic illness as manifesting itself psychotically as a person breaking 
with reality or at least a weak sense of reality, there can be a pathology that extends in the 
opposite direction, as Donald Winnicott notes: “there are others who are so firmly anchored in 
objectively perceived reality that they are ill in the opposite direction of being out of touch with 
the subjective world and with the creative approach to fact.”15  
 One way this can begin is in the nexus of relations that form the self’s developmental 
context.  Since the self is always ensconced within relations, the dynamics of these relations can 
exhibit features that either encourage the development of a creative, reflective, dialectical being 
or they can frustrate the capacities and desire for an imaginative, creative and flourishing 
existence.  The former we can refer to as anabolic relations and the latter as katabolic 
 
14 As Cornelius Castoriadis observes on this point: “Socialization is the process whereby the psyche is 
forced to abandon (never fully) its pristine solipsistic meaning for the shared meanings provided by society.  
Introjection goes always much further than animal mimesis, because it is always reinterpretation of that which is 
introjected, and this reinterpretation can only take place on the basis of the existing proper schemata.” “Radical 
Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary.” In David Ames Curtis (ed.) The Castoriadis Reader. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997): 319-337, 330. 
15 Donald Winnicott, Playing and Reality. (London: Tavistock, 1971), 78. 
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relations.16  One of the ways that reification can shape the psychic inner world of the self is by 
de-symbolizing consciousness thereby creating a kind of one-dimensionality.  The subject sees 
self and world in terms of the concrete definitions and standards that are presented to them, 
lacking any ability to alter their perspective or even symbolize for themselves what those objects 
may in fact be.  As Christopher Bonovitz observes about this concrete mode of thinking: “ideas 
are direct replicas of reality and not representational.  There is an inability to think about one’s 
own mind or the minds of others, to reflect on the beliefs, intentions, and desires that are in the 
background of behavior and action.”17  
 This is a serious pathology of consciousness in that the self is unable to de-reify the 
object domain.  Other people appear to them as objects and the subject also is unable to reflect 
on a higher level on the beliefs and concepts that one possesses and which serve to anchor his 
thought in the world.  As Bonovitz further notes: “In the concrete mode, the patient assigns 
objects only one meaning and is often insistent on the facts and behaviors that are observable and 
knowable, located in the external world.”18  What is particularly important here is that the need 
to focus on a single descriptive meaning implies a lack of the capacity “to play with metaphor 
and symbols”;19 that meaning becomes constricted and restrained.  Reification encourages such a 
concrete mode of thinking insofar as it is able to shape the ways that we categorize and cognize 
the world.  The key idea behind the effect of reification is, as Wilfred Bion noted about concrete 
forms of thought, that it was the drive to destroy knowing.20 
 
16 See my recent paper, “An Ontological Account of Social Pathology,” for a more developed account of 
these categories of social relations in Neal Harris (ed.) Pathology Diagnosis and Social Research: New Applications 
and Explorations. (New York: Palgrave, 2021): 113-140. 
17 Christopher Bonovitz, “On Seeing What Is Not Said: The Concrete Mode of Psychic Functioning and the 
Development of Symbolization.” Psychoanalytic Dialogues, vol. 26, no. 3 (2016): 280-293, 283.  
18 Bonovitz, “On Seeing What Is Not Said,” 283.   
19 Bonovitz, “On Seeing What Is Not Said,” 284.   
20 See W. R. Bion, Learning from Experience. (London: Tavistock, 1962).  
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 This kind of subjectivity does not occur via a direct internalization of social norms alone. 
The relations between people – katabolic relations, in particular – are central here.  The more 
individuals see one another as things, the less secure their own emotional attachments to others 
becomes.  As family life, schools, work life become increasingly subsumed by instrumental 
logics, relations between people become more instrumental.  As this happens, the emotional 
relations between people become constricted and the self’s emotional world – no less than his 
capacity to empathize and cognize the other – becomes increasingly limited, shallow and small.  
As Stephen Seligman notes: “Without the transaction between attentive people who care about 
each other’s minds and bodies, there can hardly be a sense of the difference between other 
people and things.”21  Reification has the ability to turn the inner world into this kind of one-
dimensionality: it seizes the capacity of the mind to create, explore, view the world and meaning 
from multiple vantage points, frustrates, if not totally negates, metaphorical thinking and 
spontaneous symbolic thought and replaces it with the pre-fabricated structures of meaning that 
are required for the functioning of external (i.e., social) institutions. 
 In this sense, the self is unable to generate authentic meaning and experience (at least 
consciously, unconsciously is another matter) conflict between one’s personal forms of meaning 
the collective forms of meaning that one encounters in one’s development process.  And 
meaning should be understood here as part of that basic intentional and purposeful structure of 
thought that is essential to what is distinctive about being human.  Just as Marx saw “labor” as 
the nucleus of the onto-formative capacity of human being, imagination is a crucial expression of 
the onto-formative capacity of human beings within the inner dynamics of the self; imagination 
 
21 Stephen Seligman, “Recognition and Reflection in Infancy and Psychotherapy: Convergences of 
Attachment Research with Psychoanalysis.” Psychoanalytic Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 5 (2017): 298-308, 302.  
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is crucial to one’s own capacity to shape the world.22  But reification changes this; it robs the 
capacity for autonomous generativity and replaces it with heteronomous, standardized schemes 
to direct our powers of “creation” and praxis.  This is one more way that reification must be seen 
as an ontological category: by directing the inner capacities of the self’s onto-generative powers, 
the self is folded into the imperatives of the external social world.  Insofar as this is the case, this 
self is both product and producer of that world.   It is only when this imaginative capacity is de-
autonomized, when it is disciplined and even absorbed by the cultural schemes produced by a 
commodified culture industry – it is at this level of reification that the self can be seen to be 
erased in any effective sense.  Imagination and meaning-making are taken from the subject’s 
autonomy and instead become tied to functionality, to instrumentality, to the demands, norms 
and values of institutions.   
There is little wonder why neurotic illness has decreased as capitalism has deepened and 
spread being displaced by pre-Oedipal forms of psychic pathology.  What space is there for 
neurotic conflict when one sees one’s life not in opposition to aspect of the world, but rather as a 
problem of not fitting into it more perfectly, more smoothly?  Nevertheless, the key idea here is 
that the fetishization of the commodity world impacts consciousness in a specific way: it 
conceals that one is a socio-practical being and, in the process, further reduces one to the status 
of an object.  This means a kind of de-subjectification of the subject, a rendering of the 
individual into a patterned, predictable, heteronmously directed being.  The spontaneous, 
symbol-creating, imaginative, creative being is reshaped into a being who seeks out his 
alignment with the prevailing social norms and institutions, who seeks not his own inner 
 
22 Castoriadis has insightfully noted that: “Imagination is the capacity to make be what is not in the simply 
physical world and, first and foremost, to represent to oneself and in one’s own way – that is, to present for oneself – 
that which surrounds the living being and matters for it and, undoubtedly also, its own being.” “Psychoanalysis and 
Philosophy.” In The Castoriadis Reader: 349-360, 356. 
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enrichment, but an increased conformity to the vapid values of the external world.  As 
Christopher Bollas notes, discussing this reified phenomenon or what he calls “normotic illness”: 
What is lacking is that originating subjectivity which informs our use of 
the symbolic.  The normotic does not see himself other than as an object 
(ideally smart and spruced up, productive and sociable) among all the 
objects of the material world.  Since he does not perceive himself as a 
subject, he does not ask to be seen by the other, nor does he look into the 
other.23 
 
Instead, the normotic (or reified subject) endows concrete objects and possessions with value, 
introjecting that value back into the self.  It is the need to be “normal,” that is, as aligned with the 
social patterns of meaning exemplified by the external, objective world instead of his own 
generative sense of meaning that undergirds reified subjectivity.  Bollas again: “a particular drive 
to be normal, one that is typified by the numbing and eventual erasure of subjectivity in favor of 
a self that is conceived as a material object among other man-made products in the object 
world.”24   
 What this points to is a pathology of the self that effectively smothers the capacities for 
imagination, generative meaning, libidinal spontaneity and other reservoirs for psychic energy 
that can be turned against the reifying forces of the patterned, commodified world.  What 
reification is able to achieve at the intra-psychic level is the absorption of these inherent energies 
withing the self – energies that can be translated into contestatory attitudes and alternative 
political and social imaginaries, new values, social and personal experimentation, and so on.  
Reification as the erasure of subjectivity, of the displacement of our autonomy and spontaneity 
by patterned forms of life, by the nexus of norms rooted in administrative-capitalist logics, by the 
ever-increasing sphere of instrumentality – all point to a kind of self no longer capable of seeing, 
 
23 Bollas, The Shadow of the Object, 141.  
24 Bollas, The Shadow of the Object, 135.  
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thinking, feeling and perceiving outside of the ontic world, the prevailing social reality itself.  It 
is, if you will, the final frontier of capitalist development: the subsumption of the self into the 
normative patterns of thought and action required by the dominant institutional world.   
 
6. Ontological Coherence and Anti-Reification 
What I have been describing thus far in this paper is the phenomenon of hyper-reification: a 
transformation of self and world into one that has been so thoroughly colonized by the logics of 
modern techno-capitalism that it has been able to subsume the self into its schemata.  The real 
question is now: is there a way out of this pathology?  In spite of how thorough and total the 
phenomenon of hyper-reification may seem, it is an incomplete process.  Perhaps most obvious 
is the extent to which reification engenders existential and psychic pathologies in the self.  
Anxiety, depression, loss of happiness and joy, the strain of meaningless competitive life, and 
more, all are becoming more prevalent.  These are not pathological phenomena that can be fully 
understood outside of the broad social patterns that produce them.  Access to the experience of 
these psychological pathologies is not enough in itself to shatter the guide of reification.  But if 
we were able to use this as a mean to crack the edifice of reification, then we will be able to 
grasp a means of self and social transformation. 
 What I want to suggest now is that it is only by bringing the inner, subjective experiences 
of the reified world into contact with a cognitive grasp of our social reality that such a shattering 
of reification will become possible.  What draws the self out into the domain of critical reflection 
is not some abstract cognitive procedure in and of itself; rather, it is the connection of the 
experiences of anxiety, depression and meaninglessness with the social-relational features and 
dynamics of the world I inhabit that evokes within me the drive for critique and implants a new 
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desire for mutative change.  Here we can see that both psychoanalysis and philosophy together 
can help us construct a kind of anti-reificatory way of thinking and reflecting, indeed, I would go 
so far to say, an anti-reificatory form of self-consciousness that can aid in the reclamation of 
critical judgment and critical praxis.   
 Since reification, as I have been reconstructing it here as an ontological category, 
operates centrally via a constriction of all forms of meaning, an anti-reificatory form of praxis 
must therefore begin with the self’s awareness of the inadequacy of the forms of meaning that 
shape our practices, relations and purposes.  The constriction of meaning is reified when it is 
essentially unformulated; that is, when we act in the world according to norms and values that 
remain concealed from our awareness.  The value-orientation to always be punctual, on time for 
work, deferent to your boss or supervisor, to work hard, and so on are value-orientations that are 
rooted in the heteronomic-normative (as opposed autonomic-critical) social schemes of 
capitalism.  As such, they must serve as grounding norms for our attitudes and beliefs about how 
the world functions.  The problem is: we never interrogate these value-orientations; we never 
inquire into the ways that they may thwart other forms of life, other kinds of relations and 
practices, and so on.  This is the concealment of meaning: to open these value-orientations and 
norms up to inquiry means thinking though them.  Here psychoanalysis can grant us a crucial 
first step in any anti-reificatory frame of reflection.   
 The reason for this is that psychoanalysis is premised on the technique of working that 
which is essentially unformulated in consciousness into that which can be formulated in 
consciousness and through language.  In a certain sense, reification is a kind of prohibition on 
thought: it requires that we continue to think through the world according to the external, 
heteronomic norms and values that are made ambient by the predominant social reality and its 
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institutions.  But, as Paul Ricoeur notes: “psychoanalysis is only possible as praxis because in 
fact one can break through this prohibition and, in a way, reintroduce into the linguistic 
community those who have been excommunicated from it, and thereby resymbolize what had 
been desymbolized.”25  Ricoeur here emphasizes the dynamic of psychoanalysis to be able to 
root out the complex ways that embedded, unconscious forms of psychic structure possess 
external, relational (e.g., social) origins.  The core importance here is that it is through the 
introjection of external norms and values that libidinal and cathectic ties are forged between the 
subject and the object domain.  Reification is therefore rooted in new needs for possessing 
objects, for seeing others as objects and, even ourselves as objects rather than subjects of praxis.  
The libidinal and cathectic ties enmesh the self in the predominant reality; it makes the world 
ontic, static and seem natural or at least as second nature.  Unfettering the psyche from these ties 
is a first step in anti-reification and the key idea here becomes the immanent critique of concepts, 
norms, values and practices.  All need to be raised to conscious awareness and symbolized, made 
significant in order for the next step to be taken.  
 This next step is the connection of these intrapsychic forms of meaning and value that 
undergird our cathectic and libidinal ties to the world, with the social-ontological features of the 
world we inhabit.  This means inquiring how our practices, institutions and the social purposes 
and ends toward which these are organized.  The social totality now comes into view as the 
dialectical relations between norms, practices, relations, processes and purposes are made 
apparent thereby granting the subject what I call ontological coherence: that is, a cognitive grasp 
of the social totality and one’s place within it.  This occurs only after the self has de-cathected 
itself from the totality and seeks to understand it at a critical-cognitive level.  This means 
 
25 Paul Ricoeur, On Psychoanalysis: Writings and Lectures, vol. 1. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 204.  
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grasping how our collective forms of life are shaped: how our relations are organized, what 
purposes our institutions are oriented toward, and how the norms and practices I co-articulate 
with others maintain these social schemes.  Once we come to view ourselves as cooperatively 
articulating forms of life, this opens up the possibility for change and transformation.  It reveals 
how social domination is embedded in the normative regimes that we have taken up, and reveals 
the world as possibly mutative and open for transformation.  The ontic becomes ontologized and 
reification is shattered.  
 Of course, this is a quick and, admittedly, convenient sketch of a theory of anti-
reification.  But I submit that it contains some basic and essential procedures for what we must 
consider critical reflection and critical reason.  This way of relating to the world can only come 
about through new movements in education, in aesthetic production and political discourse.  But 
it does demonstrate that, even in a speculative sense, reification can be overcome.  Indeed, if 
nothing else, these reflections on reification as a deeply constitutive process and pathology of 
modern culture should lead us to question the central movements of modern philosophical 
discourse – both its analytic as well as continental variants.  For any intellectual that ignores 
reification and the processes of administrative-capitalism that generate it do little more than 
reproduce a domesticated form of thought, one that will remain bereft of its capacity for critique, 
judgment and social change.  Intellectuals do little to aid in the process of anti-reification the 
more that they ignore the central role is plays in distorting “rational” thought.  In this sense, the 
first move for any reclamation of transformative, critical politics must be a reconceptualization 
of our ontology as social beings; of human life, as generative, cooperative and capable of 
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